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CATHOLIC TEACHING AND THE
LAW CONCERNING THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Helen M. Alvare*
INTRODUCTION
The Roman Catholic Church has had much to say on the vast
topic of New Reproductive Technologies ("NRTs"). According to
some leading voices in the field, the Church's teachings lie outside
the pace of development and acceptance of many of the new tech-
nological means for satisfying couples' and individuals' desires for
children. Still, the Church is able to command attention for various
reasons. In part, it is because of its visibility and global size, but it
is also because some of the Church's ideas have secular counter-
parts; many observers have expressed concerns that mirror some of
those proposed by the Church, even those writing from no particu-
lar religious viewpoint.
This Article will set forth the fundamental teachings from which
the Roman Catholic Church derives its positions on the NRTs. It
will further demonstrate the application of these teachings to some
of the specific medical techniques commonly used in the course of
NRTs. The Church's legislative recommendations will then be
summarized. For the most part, these recommendations have not
found their way into law or practice. Still, it will be explained that
many of the Church's most deeply-rooted concerns about both the
processes and effects of NRTs are echoed by legal scholars and
others who ground these concerns not in Catholic, but in "human"
terms. At the same time, these secular voices often come to differ-
ent conclusions than those reached by the Church. This Article
will explain how these diverging views develop from fundamental
differences in starting points. They flow also from perceptions
about the Church's "agenda" in proposing legislation concerning
NRTs.
* Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law; B.S., Villanova University, 1981; J.D., Cornell University, 1984; M.A., Sys-
tematic Theology, Catholic University of America, 1989. The Author would like to
thank Alexandra Abboud and Yvette Brown for their valuable research assistance.
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I. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH TEACHING ON MATIERS
PERTAINING TO NRTs
A. The Nature of the Human Person
In a general sense, Catholic teaching about NRTs is an excellent
example of Catholic moral reasoning. Such reasoning often begins
with an is and proceeds to one or more oughts.1 In the case of
NRTs, the Church begins by exploring the implications of the is of
the human person, and the is of the nature of human sexual inter-
course, to reveal the oughts regarding proposed methods of human
procreation. The Church has established a baseline to enable us
begin this analysis:
The fundamental values connected with the techniques of artifi-
cial human procreation are two: the life of the human being
called into existence and the specific nature of the transmission
of human life in marriage. The moral judgment on such meth-
ods of artificial procreation must therefore be formulated in
reference to these values.2
The Church has repeatedly defended its expertise in defining the
nature of the human person. Perhaps the most well-known occa-
sion was during the speech of Pope Paul VI to the United Nations
in 1965, wherein he called the Church an "expert in humanity," at
the service of life and love.3 The Church has disavowed any inten-
tion to speak scientifically, but rather, "having taken account of the
data of research and technology" it puts forward the "moral teach-
ing corresponding to the dignity of the person and to his or her
integral vocation."4 The criteria for moral judgment concerning
the dignity of the human person are threefold: 1) respect for the
human person; 2) the human being's "primary and fundamental
right to life"; and 3) the transcendent aspects of the human person
including a human soul and humanity's destiny in communion with
God.5 A deeper look at these starting points reveals important im-
plications for some of the technological imperatives of NRTs as
they are practiced today.
1. PHILIP S. KEANE, SEXUAL MORALITY: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE 43-46
(1977).
2. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RE-
SPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: RE-
PLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY (DONUM VITAE) 9-10 (1987) [hereinafter
DONUM VITAE].
3. Paul VI, Discourse to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organiza-
tion, in 57 ACTus APOSTOLICUS SEDIS 878 (1965).
4. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 6.
5. Id. at 1-2.
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The Church teaches that one ought to respect the human person
because she has been created by God, and made in the very image
and likeness of God.6 Furthermore, humans are made by God not
out of need, but out of love. We are the only creature on Earth
whom God has "wished for himself,"'7 and this places us in a special
relationship with God. Furthermore, God is our "sole end," and
the "lord of [our] life."' 8 Human identity was elevated further
when Jesus came to Earth and took on our humanity, including our
human form, in order to win our salvation.
Physical life is neither the whole of a person's value, nor the per-
son's supreme good, but in a certain way it is the fundamental
value precisely because upon it all other values are based. This is
not to devalue the human body. To do so would commit a dualist
error of valuing the human soul, but not the body. This is a com-
mon error, made initially to elevate the non-physical goods of the
person, but misused to degrade the physical body, as if when one
touches the physical one does not reach the soul. As against this
tendency, the Church emphasizes that the human body is a funda-
mental condition for human life, and for human destiny, eternal
communion with God.9 The body is a "constitutive part of the per-
son who manifests and expresses himself through it.' ' 1° Accord-
ingly, the body always merits physical respect.
During Jesus' brief life on Earth, one of the ways in which he
manifested the presence of God's "kingdom" was by healing physi-
cal ailments.'1 It is quite characteristic of Catholic moral reasoning
to consider problems presented in light of the effects upon the
human persons' integrated, body-soul nature. In the apt words of
two Catholic theologians: "It is this recognition of a basic consis-
tency in human moral experience - not only as free and rational
but also as embodied and affective - that above all else character-
izes the natural-law tradition. '12
Moving from the essential nature of the human person to the
question of developmental stages in human life, the Church
6. Genesis 1:27 (New American); DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 10.
7. Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium
et spes), in VATICAN COUNCIL II, THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS
925 (1977) [hereinafter Gaudium et spes].
8. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 11.
9. JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE, EVANGELIUM VITAE 38 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
10. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 8.
11. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 82-83.
12. THOMAS A. SHANNON & LISA SOWLE CAHILL, RELIGION AND ARTIFICIAL
REPRODUCTION 137 (1988).
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teaches that human beings merit respect from the moment of con-
ception, because we are human from conception:
From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is
neither that of the father nor of the mother; it is rather the life
of a new human being with his own growth. It would never be
made human if it were not human already.
To this perpetual evidence-perfectly independent of the discus-
sions on the moment of animation - modern genetic science
brings valuable confirmation. It has demonstrated that, from
the first instant, there is established the program of what this
living being will be: a man, this individual man with his charac-
teristic aspects already well determined. Right from fertilization
is begun the adventure of a human life, and each of its capacities
requires time - a rather lengthy time - to find its place and to be
in a position to act.13
The Church has not definitively spoken on when the soul comes
into being. It concludes that the biological data alone does not
prove the existence of a soul, but, offers a "valuable indication for
discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment
of this first appearance of a human life: how could a human indi-
vidual not be a human person?"14
Several oughts flow from these statements about the dual nature
of the human person. As interventions on the human body affect
not only the physical body, but the whole person, 15 one may cer-
tainly intervene to assist when a person is ill. This supports the
integral good of human life. This proposition is true with particular
resonance in the fields of sexuality and procreation, "in which man
and woman actualize the fundamental values of love and life."16
However, there are limits to such intervention: "The life of every
human being must be recognized and safeguarded from the mo-
ment of conception."' 7 The Church insists that all life sciences
must respect this fundamental right, including any intervention
with the human embryo not directed towards its healing, the im-
provement of its condition of health or its individual survival."i
13. SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION
ON PROCURED ABORTION 13 (1974) (citation omitted).
14. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 13.
15. Id. at 8-9.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Secretariat of State, International Norms in the Area of Bioethics 4 (Sept. 26,
1994) (unpublished monograph, on file with author).
18. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 9.
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One final trait of the human person which the Church analyzes
in order to reflect on NRTs is the intrinsically relational nature of
each person. There are two aspects to this nature. The first aspect
involves the call to act as stewards of our lives, not masters. The
second aspect is the identification of service as the primary human
vocation.
On the stewardship aspect, the Church opines that life is a "gift,"
entrusted to each person, and that each person has a fundamental
obligation to take responsibility for it. "[T]his fundamental princi-
ple must be placed at the center of one's reflection in order to clar-
ify and solve the moral problems raised by artificial interventions
on life as it originates and on the processes of procreation." 19 In
other words, humans are stewards of the lives that are gifted to
them. Our responsibility is the care of human life; there is no right
to demand the gift of life.
The second aspect of relational identity traces back to one of the
earliest biblical pronouncements from God to Adam: "It is not
good for the man to be alone. I will make a suitable partner for
him."20 It is not merely that we are to keep company with others.
Rather, as Pope John Paul II declares, the very meaning of life con-
sists in the placing of one's life at the service of God and others:
"In this way, Jesus proclaims that life finds its centre, its meaning
and its fulfillment when it is given up .... We too are called to give
our lives for our brothers and sisters, and thus to realize the full-
ness of truth the meaning and destiny of our existence." '2 1
B. The Nature of Marriage, Sexual Relations, and Procreation
There is a close relationship in Roman Catholic teaching be-
tween who the human person has been created to be, and how he
or she is to engage in human sexual intercourse, so as to share in
God's creative work of procreation.22 The transmission of human
life has "a special character of its own, which derives from the spe-
cial nature of the human person. '23
There are additional truths that flow from the very nature of sex-
ual intercourse and procreation. These truths derive primarily
from the Church's observation that the transmission of human life
19. Id. at 5.
20. Genesis 2:18 (New American).
21. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 91 (emphasis omitted).
22. COMM. FOR PRo-LIFE ACTIVITIES, THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, HUMAN SEXUALITY FROM GOD'S PERSPECTIVE: HUMANAE VITAE 25
YEARS LATER (1993) [hereinafter GOD'S PERSPECTIVE].
23. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 10.
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has been entrusted to a "personal and conscious act." Therefore,
what may be permissible for plants and animals, may not be ac-
ceptable for humans.24
According to the Church, human sexual intercourse has both a
unitive and procreative dimension. The unitive dimension is re-
flected in the fact that couples are bound together in greater love,
as a consquence of intercourse. The procreative dimension exists
in its potential to conceive new life.2 5
The procreative element of human sexual intercourse bears a
particular transcendent aspect, as the act of procreation is deemed
a sharing in God's "creative generativity. ' ' 26 It is a sharing "in a
special way in his mystery of personal communion and in his work
as Creator and Father. '27 The Church contrasts this view of human
sexuality with the purely secular view that sexual activity is an in-
stinct or need, which tends often to correspond with preeminent
concerns that the body be free from disease or unwanted preg-
nancy.28 The secular perspective also tends to correspond with the
view that sex can be used to obtain a baby, separate from its intrin-
sically unitive dimension, a coming together which includes an
"openness to the richness of life which the child represents. '29
Because human persons are a unity of body and soul, human
marriage, including married love, should reflect this unity. There-
fore, sexual intercourse should produce marital unity, and remain
open to procreation. Catholic teaching holds that marriage be-
tween a man and woman is intended to reflect the love of God for
all those persons He has created.30 Marriage is intended to reflect
this love not only to the children of the marriage, but also to the
world. Put differently, marriage is intended to reflect the possibil-
ity for permanent, unconditional love; it is to be a glimpse of the
love that God has for human persons, a love that is total, perma-
nent, and unlimited. 31 There should be a true communion of love
24. Id.
25. PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE (1968), reprinted in HUMANAE VITAE AND THE
BISHOPS 33, 39 (John Horgan ed., 1972) [hereinafter HUMANAE VITAE].
26. GoD's PERSPECTIVE, supra note 22.
27. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 9 (citation ommitted).
28. See GOD'S PERSPECTIVE, supra note 22.
29. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 42.
30. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church .... For no
one hates his own flesh but rather nourishes and cherishes it, even as Christ
does the church, because we are members of his body .... This is a great
mystery, but I speak in reference to Christ and the church.
Ephesians 5:25, 29, 32 (New American).
31. See GoD's PERSPECTIVE, supra note 22.
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within a marriage, with each spouse completely open to the other
in mutual self giving. Within this context, sexual intercourse is
never merely about need, instinct, physical realities, or pleasure.
Rather, sexual intercourse is a communion of "the .innermost being
of the human person .... [A] part of the love by which a man and
a woman commit themselves totally to one another until death. '32
A married sexual relationship is always about relation, and the
human need to form a communion of persons. Sexual intercourse
exclusively in marriage "makes sense, 33 for by its very nature and
structure, the couple is bound into a meaningful relationship that
moves out into the future; this is captured within its unitive and
procreative aspects together.
The Church recognizes married couples' "profound desire to
share their life and love by cooperating with God in creating new
life and building a family. ' 34 It further recognizes that "children
are the supreme gift of marriage and greatly contribute to the good
of the parents themselves. '35 However, children cannot be simply
"obtained"; human sexuality, and the human persons' dignity
should not be sacrificed to obtain a child. No one has a right to
another person; this would be contrary to a person's dignity and
nature. We are gifts to one another, not obligations. 36
Derived both from this teaching about human sexual inter-
course, and the teachings about human persons' dignity, is the
teaching that humans have the right to be conceived in a manner fit
for human persons. Specifically, we have the right to be the fruits
of the act of our parents' sexual intercourse.37 Pope John Paul II
calls this the child's right to have a fully human origin. It is fully
human when it conforms with the human being's personal nature.
A personal nature reflected in a conception in love that is perma-
nent, mutual, and totally self-giving, in a covenant reflecting the
same kind of love God has for the human person: "Life is a gift
that must be bestowed in a manner worthy both of the subject re-
ceiving it and of the subjects transmitting it.' '38
32. JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION ON THE FAMILY (FAMILIARIS CON-
SORTIO) 9 (1981) [hereinafter FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO].
33. Telephone Interview with Theresa Notare, Director, Diocesan Development
Program, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (Dec. 1, 2001). Ms. Notare
oversees the development of materials for Catholic dioceses on Natural Family Plan-
ning and Chastity.
34. See GoD's PERSPECTIVE, supra note 22.
35. Gaudium et spes, supra note 7, at 953.
36. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 32-34.
37. Id. at 31.
38. Id. at 19.
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C. Particular Judgments of NRTs
Having looked at the Church's teachings regarding the nature of
the human person and human sexual relationships, it is possible to
evaluate specific aspects of NRTs in light of Church doctrine. One
ought to begin by noting that the Church does not reject particular
procedures on the grounds that they are artificial. Rather, the
Church first morally evaluates them according to the "dignity of
the human person."39 Second, the value and meaning of coming
together in marriage determine from the moral point of view the
meaning and limits of artificial interventions to conceive new
human life. Interfering with the nature of the marital sexual union
can damage both individual persons as well as their relationships.40
Artificial means which do not serve the human person, human
marriage, or family life, but rather place technology over persons
are problematic. In other words, technology should not be evalu-
ated from the standpoint of its own results, efficiency, or ability to
gratify long and deeply held wishes, if the technology acts at the
expense of others. Rather, technology must serve human values,
ordering itself to the nature of the human person, and the truth of
human sexual intercourse.4
The Church supports interventions that address infertility itself.
Despite a popular perception that NRTs address infertility, most
procedures aim to "leap over" or "circumvent" infertility problems
by finding a substitute for that which a particular human body is
lacking.42 This regularly includes substitutes for a man's sperm
and/or a woman's egg, via gamete or embryo donation,4 3 for natu-
ral fertilization via in vitro fertilization, or intra-cytoplasmic sperm
injection (the injection of male sperm directly into a female egg),
or even for the womb of the mother who intends to rear the child
via surrogacy.
39. Id. at 9.
40. See HUMANAE VITAE, supra note 25, at 39-40.
41. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 7.
42. OLIVER O'DONOVAN, BEGOTTEN OR MADE? 32 (1984). At the time of writing
Begotten or Made?, O'Donovan was a member of the Church of England's Board for
Social Responsibility.
43. The eggs or sperm of the persons who are not the intended parent are regu-
larly referred to as "donor gametes." However, they are regularly purchased by recip-
ients for prices ranging from as low as $50.00 to as high as $50,000.00. See LORI B.
ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE 92-102 (1999); Future Shock (ABC World News televi-
sion broadcast Aug. 22, 1999).
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1. Procedures on the Human Embryo
Procedures aimed at healing and improving the embryo's health
are approved by the Church, as they are consonant with the dignity
of human life.44 However, many procedures employed in the
course of the NRTs either place the embryo at great risk or involve
its deliberate destruction. In fact, various techniques involving the
human embryo were performed for years prior to being attempted
on chimps.45
The Church condemns non-therapeutic operations on human
embryos. Instead, it urges a "moral certainty of not causing harm
to the life or integrity of the unborn child and the mother. ' 46 The
Church also calls for the informed consent of both parents before
such procedures can occur.
Some NRTs entail the deliberate destruction of human embryos
or fetuses. The destruction of human embryos occurs in proce-
dures where embryos are pre-selected for a particular sex, such as
when parents attempt to avoid bearing a child with an inherited,
sex-specific disease, or during or after preimplantation genetic di-
agnosis.47 Human fetuses may be destroyed when a large number
of embryos have been implanted in a woman's womb, and more
than one begins to develop. When this occurs, doctors will often
recommend that a certain number of the developing lives be
aborted or "selectively reduced."
In addition to the deliberate destruction of embryos, many NRTs
suffer from a high failure rate, leading to the demise of thousands
of embryos and fetuses in labs across the United States. In the
words of John Paul II:
Apart from the fact that they are morally unacceptable since
they separate procreation from the fully human context of the
conjugal act, these techniques have a high rate of failure: not
just failure in relation to fertilization, but with regard to the sub-
sequent development of the embryo, which is exposed to the
risk of death, generally within a very short space of time.48
One technique commonly employed is cryopreservation, the
"freezing" of embryos not needed for immediate use. Despite the
44. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 14-15.
45. ANDREWS, supra note 43, at 15.
46. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 16.
47. Moshe Zilberstein & Machelle M. Seibel, Preimplantation Genetics and Preim-
plantation Diagnosis, in INFERTILITY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT 761-72 (2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter INFERTILITY].
48. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 25 (citation omitted).
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frequency with which both scientific experts and laypersons refer
to "frozen embryos," it is by no means certain that any particular
percentage of frozen embryos will survive either the freezing or
thawing processes.49
The Church holds that even the "noble" ends for which these
technologies may be employed cannot justify this kind of destruc-
tive experimentation on human life.5° On the contrary, a special
duty is owed to human life which "finds itself most vulnerable
when it enters the world and when it leaves the realm of time to
embark upon eternity. 5 1
2. Fertilization Outside the Human Body
A number of NRTs such as in vitro fertilization, intra-cytoplas-
mic sperm injection, and zygote intrafallopian transfer, in which an
embryo fertilized outside of the human body is reinserted in the
woman's fallopian tubes,52 involve penetration of the egg by the
sperm outside of the human body. In the Church's judgment, when
fertilization occurs outside the body, the procreative aspect of
human sexuality has been wrongly severed from its unitive aspect,
the spiritual and physical union of the parents. Procreation is thus
deprived of the meanings that come from its bodily source, and
from the message that a man and a woman communicate to one
another when they engage in human sexual intercourse. This form
of procreation is instead dominated by the rubric and standards of
scientific technology: efficiency and domination over nature. 53 It is
not the result of a communion of persons in love. The child is de-
prived of being the result of procreation from a "fully human"
communion, which involves a meeting both "of the sense and of
the spirit. '5 4 Love is absent at the moment of this type of fertiliza-
tion; accordingly, it is not a method of procreation fit for the dig-
nity of the human person.
It may happen that a couple seeks to use technological means to
accomplish conception with their own sperm and egg, with the act
of fertilization taking place either outside or inside the body of the
49. Patrick Quinn et al., Cryopreservation and Infertility, in INFERTILITY, supra
note 47, at 799.
50. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 16-17.
51. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 77.
52. See generally THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY 62-63 (1998).
53. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 26-28.
54. HUMANAE VITAE, supra note 25, at 37.
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woman. This is possible using methods of homologous artificial in-
semination. The Church disapproves of this practice, as it sepa-
rates the unitive and procreative goods of sexual intercourse.5 5
However, theological debate continues as to whether a technique
known as gamete intrafallopian transfer (whereby gametes are in-
serted in a location within the woman's fallopian tubes where fer-
tilization may take place),56 can be employed to satisfy the
Church's criteria that, "If the technical means facilitates the conju-
gal act or helps it to reach its natural objectives, it can be morally
acceptable."57
3. Extra-Marital and Non-Marital Conceptions
There are a number of ways in which conception by means of
NRTs takes place outside of marriage, such as when a spouse ob-
tains an egg, sperm, embryo, or surrogate mother. This also occurs
when an unmarried person becomes a parent by means of a sperm
or egg bank, or even an embryo adoption agency or fertility clinic
selling "spare" embryos. Finally, posthumous conception employ-
ing the sperm of a deceased male can also produce conception
outside of marriage. In these situations, the potential relationship
between the child and one or both biological parents is intention-
ally severed, either contractually or by operation of law.
The Church recognizes every child's right to be conceived and
gestated to birth within circumstances reflecting his or her human
dignity, such as within an ongoing marriage. This dignity requires
that the child be the fruit of a love that is permanent, mutual, and
completely self-giving,58 and within a covenant reflecting the same
kind of love God has for the child. Thus, the Church condemns all
heterologous artificial fertilization (usually known as artificial in-
semination by means of donor sperm), as well as the process of
bringing together the gametes of other than two spouses. The
Church's view is that an essential aspect of the marital bond is mar-
ital fidelity, wherein the spouses' observe "reciprocal respect of
their right to become a father and a mother only through each
other. '59  Conceptions outside marriage do not reflect this
relationship.
55. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 31-32.
56. SHANNON & SOWLE CAHILL, supra note 12, at 6-7.
57. Id. at 64.
58. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 23 (citing Gaudium et spes, supra note 7, at
953).
59. Id.
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The Church has opined that it is only "through the secure and
recognized relationship to his own parents that the child can dis-
cover his own identity and achieve his own proper human develop-
ment."6 The absence of such a relationship can hinder the
"maturing of [the child's] personal identity."' 61 On a social level,
the Church notes that "the good of the children and of the parents
contributes to the good of civil society; the vitality and stability of
society require that children come into the world within a family
and that the family be firmly based on marriage. "62 Damage to
personal relationships in the family threatens the unity and stability
of the family, causing societal disorder and dissension.63
The scientific community also contemplates several methods of
creating human life which, in the eyes of the Church, lack both the
unitive and procreative dimensions of human sexuality. These in-
clude methods such as cloning, parthenogenesis (creating a human
person from the gamete of one sex), and twin fission (dividing one
human embryo into two). The Church judges these methods as vi-
olating the integrity of human procreation and marriage.64
D. The Church's Legislative Recommendations
The Church understands that not all moral objectives can be re-
alized by means of law. Put differently, it is impossible for civil law
to take the place of personal conscience. The Church further ac-
knowledges that certain moral problems must be tolerated because
they cannot be forbidden without a resulting greater evil.65 At the
same time, the Church suggests that there are matters which must
be regulated by law, because they pose direct threats to human life
and social order.
The Church readily concludes that NRTs can affect constitutive
elements of civil society and order, touch upon fundamental values
about the right to life of innocent persons, and affect the family
and marital life. From the Church's perspective, NRTs affect "ina-
lienable rights of the person," rights given to persons not by the
state, but by virtue of being human beings, including the right of a
child to be conceived in a manner befitting her dignity.66 It is the
Church's view that NRTs expose human beings to grave violations
60. Id.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 24-25.
64. Id. at 19.
65. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 129.
66. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 36.
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of their human rights. The Church notes that it is quite unlikely
that researchers in the field will regulate their conduct in order to
sufficiently ensure the respect of personal rights and public order;
as a result, lawmaking by the state is required to protect these
rights.67 This view is shared by some observers who would leave
the fundamental practices of NRTs legally untouched.68
Nevertheless, while the Church suggests certain means of repro-
duction be outlawed, it urges humanity to remember that "every
child which comes into the world must in any case be accepted as a
living gift of the divine Goodness and must be brought up with
love. "69
The Church has primarily recommended two types of laws re-
garding NRTs. These laws correspond to the Church's suggested
list of threats posed to human life by NRTs: threats to the dignity
of the human person, and threats to the institution of marriage.
The following Section will examine the Church's legislative agenda
in the context of NRTs. This Section will describe the Church's
recommendations, and compare those recommendations with cur-
rently enacted or proposed legislation. Fundamental presumptions
which may explain the differences between the Church's and
states' views will be identified, as well as some concerns about
NRTs shared by both Catholic and non-Catholic sources. In con-
clusion, this Section will explore some proposed practical explana-
tions for suspicion of and opposition to the Church's role in the
public and legal conversation about NRTs.
1. Ban on Destructive Experimentation
The Church proposes allowing procedures on embryos that re-
spect their life, such as those procedures that are directed to their
healing and improvement and proceed without disproportionate
risks. However, the Church proposes legally forbidding treatments
having disproportionate risks, or actions which treat embryos (or
any stage of human life, for that matter) as objects of experimenta-
tion. The Church also supports a law forbidding the direct killing
of human life at any stage, from conception to natural death.70
67. Id. at 35-38.
68. ANDREWS, supra note 43, at 221; Weldon E. Havens & James J. Dalessio, The
Ever Widening Gap Between the Science of Artificial Reproductive Technology and the
Laws Which Govern that Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 829 (1999).
69. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 31.
70. Id. at 35-38; EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 113-15.
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Effectively, these proposals call for banning all procedures which
fertilize an embryo outside of the human body, for embryos ex-
posed to conditions other than their natural environments are han-
dled "experimentally," in so far as there are many risks to the
continuing life of the embryo inherent in the procedures them-
selves.7 The Church proposes banning the cryopreservation of
embryos, donation of embryos for research (even if directed to the
treatment of disease), direct destruction of "spare" embryos, and
the selective reduction of developing fetuses in a multiple
pregnancy.72
The law on these matters is currently in flux, but it may be con-
cluded that its general state is counter to the Church's position.
Federal funding is forbidden for procedures involving the destruc-
tion of embryonic, fetal, or even more developed unborn human
life, whether via experimentation, fertility clinic decisions, or the
selective reduction of a multiple pregnancy, (with the exception of
funding abortions for patients with Medicaid insurance in limited
circumstances). 73 However, all of these procedures are legally per-
missible, largely due to the Supreme Court's abortion decisions.74
Furthermore, regarding the federal statute banning the use of fed-
eral funds for "research in which embryos are harmed or de-
stroyed, 75 President Bush has interpreted this statute as allowing
the federal funding of research on certain "lines" of human pluri-
potent stem cells derived from embryos destroyed with private
funds before the President's public announcement on August 9,
2001.76 Cryopreservation of human embryos, donation of embryos
for research, and the ordinary practices of NRTs, such as in vitro
fertilization and intra ctyoplasmic sperm injection, which may re-
sult in the loss of the embryos, are generally permitted in the pri-
vate sector. However, nine states forbid nontherapeutic research
on extra-uterine human embryos,77 with Louisiana requiring that
71. Neri Laufer et al., In Virto Fertilization, in INFERTILITY, supra note 47, at 723-
25.
72. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 113-15.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(b) (2001).
74. E.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 803 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(b).
76. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research, (Aug. 9,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html.
77. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123, 129 (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1593 (West 1992) (banning experimentation on any "live human fetus" intra or ex-
tra uterine); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a) I-IV (1996) (defining "fetus" to in-
clude an embryo; forbids research or experimentation on fetus in or out of mother's
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any embryo manipulation be undertaken for the purpose of bring-
ing about the development of a new human life.7 s
There have been proposals for either reforming current laws or
adopting voluntary practice standards that would serve to bridge a
bit of the distance toward the Church's positions on the NRTs, but
with important differences. One proposal from the American Soci-
ety of Reproductive Medicine would limit the number of embryos
that may be implanted within a single attempt to bring about a
pregnancy, thus lowering the possibility of selective reduction: "Al-
though multifetal pregnancy reduction is possible to reduce fetal
number, its use does not completely eliminate associated risks of
multiple pregnancy and may result in the loss of all fetuses and
have adverse psychological consequences for patients. '79 Another
proposal is the requirement of obtaining advanced informed con-
sent from patients so that fertility clinics do not dispose of embryos
in manners that would be objected to by the sources of sperm and
eggs. 80 A 1999 Center for Disease Control survey discovered that
in sometimes high percentages of patients, clinics handling em-
bryos did not obtain consent for the manner of disposing patients'
embryos, including donating the embryos to research."'
womb); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2685(1) (2001) (prohibiting use of the human em-
bryo for nontherapeutic research); MINN. STAT. § 145.422 (1998) (forbidding research
or experimentation except to protect the life of the "conceptus," defined to include
embryos); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2 (1997) (banning all research or experimenta-
tion on human fetuses including embryos); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216(a) (2000) (pro-
tecting from fertilization "unborn child" from any nontherapeutic medical
procedure); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a) (2000) (banning any research or experimen-
tation, on embryos as well as fetuses); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-14-16, 34-1-1
(Michie 2001) (making it a crime to conduct nontherapeutic research with substantial
risk of harm to that destroys a human embryo; also bans use of cells or tissue that a
person knows were obtained as a result of harm to embryos).
78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123, 129 (recognizing human embryo outside the
womb as "juridical person," and forbiding manipulation except for purposes of the
"complete development of human in utero implantation.").
79. A PRACTICE COMM. REPORT OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF REPROD. MED., GUIDE-
LINES ON NUMBER OF EMBRYOS TRANSFERRED (Nov. 1991); see also ANDREWS,
supra note 43, at 57; SUSAN LEWIS COOPER & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, BEYOND
INFERTILITY: THE NEW PATHS TO PARENTHOOD 66 (1994) (reporting on the recom-
mendations by the IVF America Program); C. Staessen et al., Avoidance of triplet
pregnancies by elective transfer of two good quality embryos, 1993 HUM. REPROD.
1650, 1650-53.
80. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Informed Consent and the Use of Gametes and
Embryos for Research, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY, 780, 780-81 (1997).
81. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FINAL REPORT: SURVEY OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: EMBRYO LABORATORY PROCEDURES AND
PRACTICES, Report Summary, App. G, 14, CDC Contract 200-96-0511 (Jan. 29, 1999),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/pdf/ARTsurvey.pdf.
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Save for those state laws forbidding embryo research, the pro-
posals above suggest entirely voluntary actions to improve services
to patients. These proposals would not stop the destruction of em-
bryos as recommended by the Church. However, they forward the
notion that embryos and fetuses merit some special handling, while
continuing to allow embryos to be put at risk for the purpose of
permitting artificial reproduction to go forward.
2. Banning Techniques which Separate Procreation from the
Marital Relationship
The Church also recommends banning the use of donor gametes
or embryos, surrogate motherhood, and post-mortem conception.
It urges the state to forbid the destruction of rights inherent in the
relationship between spouses, as these rights form the foundation
for a civil society, such as the right of spouses to have children by
one another in an ongoing marriage.82
State laws currently do not ban the donation of gametes. They
do not ban post-mortem conception. There are several ongoing le-
gal challenges by parents of children conceived posthumously, to
the Social Security Administration's refusal to award survivor ben-
efits.83 Otherwise, the matter of posthumous conception generally
escapes public or legal attention.
State law on surrogacy is evolving. More states are currently
against the practice than allow it. Some states ban surrogacy,84
some draw a distinction between compensated and uncompensated
surrogacy 8 5 and a few states allow it.86 Surrogacy has attracted a
good deal of negative commentary, including criticisms from femi-
nist perspectives.87 Yet in the states where surrogacy is allowed, it
is a steady business for those clinics specializing in it.
There have been relatively few proposals for further legislation
in the areas of surrogacy, donor gametes, and post-mortem procre-
ation. Two states currently ban the sale of a woman's egg or em-
bryo.88 Only New Hampshire places an age limit on the recipient
82. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 35-38.
83. Denise Lavoie, Kids from Frozen Sperm Denied Benefits, COLUMBIAN, Sept. 2,
2001, at All.
84. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-401 to -402 (2001); MICH. COMp. LAWS
§§ 722.851-.863 (2002); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 1988).
85. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (2)-199.990 (Michie 1995); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991).
86. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 168-B:16(I)(b) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156-
165 (Michie 2000).
87. See generally GENA COREA ET AL., MAN-MADE WOMEN (1987).
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122, 9:130.
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of a donor gamete or embryo.89 It remains unclear whether laws
banning sales of body parts in some states would be interpreted to
forbid the sale of gametes or embryos. There have been proposals
to limit the price a person may be paid for his or her gametes. 90
One state briefly considered a bill that would forbid potential par-
ents from choosing a gamete donor based upon a physical or psy-
chological profile. That same bill proposed that donors should be
limited in the number of donations they can make and in the
amount they may be paid.9 Such proposals recognize the same
concerns held by the Church on NRTs, yet they do not seek to ban
the procedures themselves.
Before considering the reasons for the differences between the
Church's proposals and extant regulation, it is important to note
that the Church has not specifically addressed the question of
whether such technologies are protected under the United States
Constitution, as this is not the type of question that the Church
tends to take up in its "universal" documents. However, it is possi-
ble to deduce some of the subject matter the Church would inter-
pose when considering such a constitutional question. The
question might be phrased as follows: "Does a Constitution that
has been interpreted to contain a right of privacy broad enough to
encompass contraception and abortion, and rights to marry and
rear a family, include the right to choose to procreate and parent
by means of the NRTs?" In order clearly to consider the Church's
reflections on this question, one must first prescind from many of
the ongoing controversies in this area, such as whether cases af-
firming the right to avoid procreation may be interpreted to also
affirm the positive right to procreate, and to do so using technolog-
ical means.92
It seems very likely the Church would first raise the issue of
threats to human life posed by NRTs. This issue certainly figures
prominently not only in the documents of the Holy See, but also in
89. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13.
90. The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Financial Incentives in
Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 74 FERTILITY & STERILITY 216, 216-20 (2000) [herein-
after Financial Incentives].
91. S.B. 1630, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2000).
92. See generally Lori B. Andrews & Nanett Elster, Regulating Reproductive Tech-
nologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 39-40 (2000); Lori B. Andrews, Reproductive Technol-
ogy Comes of Age, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 375, 376 (1999); Bruce Hafen, The
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy - Balancing the Indi-
vidual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 528-34 (1983); Ann MacLean Mas-
sie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional Problem?, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 487, 505 (1991).
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amicus briefs filed before the United States Supreme Court by the
United States Catholic Conference of Bishops.93 In exceptionally
strong language, John Paul II said, "When a parliamentary or social
majority decrees that it is legal, at least under certain conditions, to
kill unborn human life, is it not really making a 'tyrannical' deci-
sion with regard to the weakest and most defenseless of human
beings?" 94
The Church would also bring to bear on the constitutional ques-
tion, the issue of possible threats to the well being of the least pow-
erful parties in artificial reproductive transactions. This category
might include the children conceived, especially those born deliber-
ately with one legal parent, those whose married parents are not
their biological parents, and those with siblings lost to selective re-
duction. Other persons whose well-being is at stake might include
the donors of gametes or embryos, who might suffer from the
processes used to obtain eggs and sperm. For men, this process
regularly includes masturbating in a pornographic setting.95 For
women, this includes a weeks-long process involving hormone in-
jections to cause hyperovulation, and surgery, sometimes under
general anesthesia, to remove the eggs. 96 There are also the psy-
chological ramifications for these parties; possible feelings of being.
"commodified" as a source of gametes, and the loss of relationship
with their biological children.97
The Church would also likely raise the possibility of threats to
the institution of marriage and the family posed by NRTs, particu-
larly the possible weakening of the marital bond by means of re-
production involving donor gametes, surrogates, or the availability
of NRTs to single persons.
3. The Sources of Differences
The Church's fundamental premise about the human person and
human procreation can be distinguished from the premise often
93. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae of United States Catholic Conference,
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744); Brief of
Amici Curiae United States Catholic Conference, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
94. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 127.
95. ANDREWS, supra note 43, at 35.
96. Mark Damario & Zev Rosenwaks, Ovum Donation, in INFERTILITY, supra
note 47, at 780-87.
97. PRACTICE COMM., AM. Soc'Y FOR REPROD. MED., GUIDELINES ON REPETI-
TIVE OOCYTE DONATION 2 (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.asrm.org/Media/Prac-
tice/oocyte-donation.pdf ("[O]ocyte donation may entail potential psychological
risks, (ambivalence, regret, etc.).").
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found in writings by those who support or tolerate continued legal
use of NRTs, or even argue for their constitutional protection. The
reasoning underlying the latter position often begins by assigning
substantial or even definitive legal weight to persons' desires for
children in the face of infertility or some other obstacle to
childbearing.98 This position often interprets constitutional tradi-
tion regarding procreation and parenting as recognizing a large
measure of individual authority by a person over his or her own
body. This is often joined with an understanding of the constitu-
tional right of privacy to include a right to make virtually all deci-
sions relating to procreation. This, in turn, is due to an
understanding of the act of procreative decision making as an in-
herently private matter. 99 The Supreme Court's opinions in the ar-
eas of contraception and abortion are regularly cited for these
propositions, particularly the very expansive language found in the
majority opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird,100 affirming the "right of
the individual, married or single to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."' 01
A broad view of individual rights determining the shape of mar-
riage and family also underlies the opinion that the state ought to
refrain from intrusively regulating NRTs. Specifically, this view as-
serts a substantive due process right to make a wide range of
choices about marriage, family life, and the rearing of children. 2
On the other hand, while the Church certainly recognizes human
free will, it sees the human body always as "in relation" or "in soli-
darity" with others and with God. The Church also understands
human freedom intrinsically to incorporate this relational aspect,
and to include an orientation to truth and God.0 3 The Church
98. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDI-
CAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 222, OTA-BA-358 (1998) [hereinafter MEDICAL AND SO-
CIAL CHOICES]; John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 912, 915 (1996).
99. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22-42 (1994); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Legislative
Regulation of Surrogacy and Reproductive Technology, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 613, 616
(1994); Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried,
98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 685 (1985).
100. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
101. Id. at 453.
102. MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, supra note 98, at 222; ROBERTSON, supra
note 99, at 35-38; Lori B. Andrews, Is there a Right to Clone? Constitutional Chal-
lenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 664-65 (1998); Robert-
son, supra note 98, at 914.
103. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 22.
20021
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
teaches that true human freedom with respect to the body requires
actions which respect the truth of the human person and human
sexual intercourse. Even when looking at actions which appear to
affect only a few persons-an intended mother and father, gamete
donors, or a child-and which appear to be the product of "free
choice," the Church judges that authentic freedom may be violated
and a wider swath of humanity harmed: "[M]an cannot find true
happiness - towards which he aspires with all his being - other
than in respect of the laws written by God in his very nature, laws
which he must observe with intelligence and love."' 4 In the words
of the Catholic Bishops of the United States: "[H]uman beings find
fulfillment in pursuing what is authentically good for the human
person as created by God. The pursuit of disordered desires mas-
querading as 'interests' easily leads to violence or greed, or self-
indulgence or loneliness.' 1 5 Clearly, this view contrasts with a
more individualistic notion of bodily freedom in the context of
procreation.
On the nature of marriage and family relationships, the Church
holds, as opposed to those who would support conceptions outside
of marriage by means of NRTs, that there is a direct relationship
between preserving civil society and what is often called the
"traditional nuclear family." This family is usually defined to in-
clude two married parents and their own biological children. The
Church warns that if the civil law recognizes the violation of "a
right inherent in the relationship between the spouses"1 °6-a right
to have children only by each other-marriage itself could deterio-
rate, leading to the deterioration of civil society. The same is true
if society violates children's right to be born in circumstances equal
to their dignity as human persons.
The Church's view is in contrast with a position that would sup-
port, for example, collaborative reproduction or surrogacy, accord-
ing to the notion that individual choice about matters of family life
supports freedom and respects persons.' Under this view, these
matters are inherently private.108 This position also points to the
fact that modern social life is replete with family forms that do not
104. HUMANAE VITAE, supra note 25, at 31.
105. COMM. FOR PRo-LIFE ACTIVITIES, THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, FAITHFUL FOR LIFE: A MORAL REFLECTION 8 (1995).
106. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 37.
107. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 300; Rob-
ertson, supra note 98, at 914.
108. Shultz, supra note 99, at 616.
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correspond to the "traditional family." This social "fact" should be
recognized in law. To do otherwise is deemed-sometimes explic-
itly, sometimes implicitly-to dishonor or demean these non-tradi-
tional families. 10 9
E. Mutual Concerns
While acknowledging the differences between Church teachings,
extant law, and legal and ethical proposals on NRTs, it should be
noted that many of the deeper misgivings the Church has about
NRTs have been articulated even by many who would support
their continued legality. In addition to the above expressed con-
cerns about marital discord, the well-being of the children con-
ceived with such technologies, and the practice of terminating
incipient human life as a seemingly regular and necessary part of
the practice of the NRTs, the Church has three fundamental con-
cerns about the effects of the NRTs. These include fears about the
commodification of human persons and human material, the domi-
nation of technology and technological experts over humanity, and
eugenics. The following Sections will articulate the Church's con-
cerns in these areas, note some agreement among observers
outside of the Church, and conclude with proposed reasons for
continued suspicion of the Church's proposals and ways in which
these gaps might be bridged by the Church.
1. Eugenics
The Church calls it "neonatal euthanasia" when embryos or fe-
tuses are destroyed prior to birth in response to a genetic "diagno-
sis" either during pregnancy, or even prior to the embryo's
implantation.110 The Church fears that discoveries in genetics may
be used as a pretext for ideologies which affirm ethnic or racial
superiority. Speaking in Evangelium Vitae of prenatal diagnosis for
purposes of considering abortion, Pope John Paul II opined: "This
is eugenic abortion, justified in public opinion on the basis of a
mentality - mistakenly held to be consistent with the demands of
'therapeutic interventions' - which accepts life only under certain
conditions and rejects it when it is affected by any limitation, hand-
icap or illness." ' Continuing, he noted that such practices "pre-
109. Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemina-
tion: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 (1981);
Shultz, supra note 99, at 617.
110. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 36.
111. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 25-26.
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sume to measure the value of a human life only within the
parameters of 'normality' and physical well-being, thus opening the
way to legitimizing infanticide and euthanasia as well." '112
In practice, many would-be parents often tend to choose
progenitors they perceive as "superior" donors for eggs and sperm.
"If we enabled them to search for PhDs, that would be the only
donors they would look at," notes the administrator of a Maryland
surrogate parenthood and donor clinic about her clients. 1 3 An-
other clinic director believes that parents want their children to be
more beautiful, but they don't admit it: "They [the intended par-
ents] say: 'We like her because she seems warmer.' But it's never
the truth."' 14
Many observers share these concerns about the aggregate and
long-term effects of such choices.1 15 Even among those who gener-
ally accept the legitimacy of such choices, there are predictions of
possible future distinctions between the privileged who can
"choose" their children and their traits, and those less privileged.'" 6
Other commentators are concerned about the racial distinctions in
the use and availability of NRTs, and even the future possibility of
selection against homosexuals." 7 Professor Twila Perry observes:
"Because the standard of beauty in this country is a white one, in
the world of reproductive technology, the genetic material of
Blacks is essentially worthless.""' 8
2. The Authority of Technology
Another concern expressed by the Church regards the control
that individual researchers will have over citizens, in the absence of
112. Id. at 114.
113. Martha Frase-Blunt, Ova-Compensating? Women Who Donate Eggs to Infer-
tile Couples Earn a Reward But Pay a Price, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2001, at F1, F6.
114. Sharon Krum, American Beauty; Here is Lauren Bush, This Year's Model, IN-
DEP. LONDON, June 17, 2001, at 1, 2.
115. ANDREWS, supra note 43, at 135 ("The real tragedy of a eugenics plan is that it
may in many cases overlook the very people who would be the best parents.");
Madhu Kishwar, The Continuing Deficit of Women In India and the Impact of Amni-
ocentesis, in COREA ET AL., supra note 87, at 34 ("Whatever other potential advan-
tages sex determination tests may have, they are likely to be used in India as an
incentive to destroy female foetuses [sic].").
116. LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN 3-8 (1998).
117. Aaron S. Greenberg & J. Michael Bailey, Parental Selection of Children's Sex-
ual Orientation, 30 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV., 423, 423-25 (2001).
118. TWila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and Family Law at the Mil-
lenium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 461, 472 (1999).
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additional legislation and regulation. 119 Pope John Paul II goes so
far as to say:
[T]hrough these procedures [IVF and embryo destruction], with
apparently contrary purposes, life and death are subjected to the
decision of man, who thus sets himself up as the giver of life and
death by decree. This dynamic of violence and domination may
remain unnoticed by those very individuals who, in wishing to
utilize this procedure, become subject to it themselves.1 20
This type of procedure, he continues, "leads, whether one wants
it or not, to man's domination over the life and death of his fellow
human beings and can lead to a system of radical eugenics."'121 A
recent announcement by a biotechnology company that it had
manufactured or cloned embryos in order to extract their stem
cells for experimentation met with similar concerns from observers
outside the Church. 122 There is concern about the exercise of
purely scientific authority on feminist grounds as well:
Whether 'old' or 'new', these procedures have in common that
they represent an artificial invasion of the human body ....
Increasingly, more and more control is taken away from an indi-
vidual's body and concentrated in the hands of 'experts' ... who
fiercely compete with one another on this 'new frontier' of sci-
entific discovery and monetary profits.123
3. Commodification of the Human Person
A final concern expressed by the Church is its fear that NRTs
may lead to the commodification of the human person. This re-
lates to the Church's conclusion that those who perform and par-
ticipate as patients in the NRTs usurp the proper place of God
within the act of procreation. In the words of John Paul II: "When
we lose sight of who we are in light of God" we are led to a:
[P]ractical materialism, which breeds individualism, utilitarian-
ism and hedonism.... The values of being are replaced by those
of having.
119. DONUM VITAE, supra note 2, at 35-38.
120. Id. at 21.
121. Id.
122. Diana K. Sugg, Complex Challenges of Cloning, BALT. SUN, Dec. 13, 2001, at
2A.
123. Renate Duelli Klein, What's 'New' About the 'New' Reproductive Technolo-
gies?, in COREA ET AL., supra note 87, at 65.
2002]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Within this same cultural climate, the body is no longer per-
ceived as a properly personal reality, a sign and place of rela-
tions with others, with God and with the world .... [S]exuality,
too, is depersonalized and exploited . . . . [I]f [procreation] is
welcomed, this is only because it expresses a desire, or indeed
the intention, to have a child "at all costs", and not because it
signifies the complete acceptance of the other and therefore an
openness to the richness of life which the child represents." 24
Fears about commodifying human bodies, have led a number of
observers to offer cautious words about proceeding with NRTs.
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine cites the concern
that "payment for oocytes implies that they are property or com-
modities and thus devalues human life.' 1 25 At the same time, the
Society believes this threat might be overcome by deeming the
compensation to be, not for the eggs themselves, but for the incon-
venience of the procedures to retrieve them. 126 Professor Margaret
Radin suggests that not only commodification, but gender hierar-
chy concerns are raised in the special case of the surrogacy con-
tract.' 27 She suggests it would be helpful to ban surrogacy, but
after noting various objections that might be raised on the grounds
of unduly limiting "people's choices," suggests at least a ban on
paid surrogacy. 28 Another writer, feminist scholar Andrea Dwor-
kin, assesses the current situation in terms that are a good deal
more stark: "'Women can sell reproductive capacities the same
way old-time prostitutes sold sexual ones . . . .' While sexual prosti-
tutes sell vagina, rectum and mouth, reproductive-prostitutes will
sell other body parts: wombs; ovaries; eggs. 1' 29
CONCLUSION-SUSPICIONS AND SUGGESTED BRIDGES
An even-handed review of the Catholic Church's teachings on
NRTs must acknowledge the Church's sincere attempts to safe-
guard vulnerable participants and the dignity of the human person
as an individual, a marital partner, and a procreator. However, the
gulf between the Church's policy recommendations and existing
law is vast. It is useful to point out that in addition to the funda-
mentally different starting points and frameworks of the Church
124. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 9, at 40-42 (emphasis omitted).
125. Financial Incentives, supra note 90, at 217.
126. Id.
127. MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 144 (1996).
128. Id.
129. Gena Corea, The Reproductive Brothel, in COREA ET AL., supra note 87, at 39
(citation omitted) (quoting ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 182 (1983)).
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and contrary observers, there are other possible reasons why the
Church's voice has been less influential in this field than its seri-
ous-and often shared-arguments might merit. The brief list of
reasons below is not intended to be an exhaustive one, but a practi-
cal list that takes into consideration the variety of subject matters
that are at play within the subject of NRTs. It is also an invitation
to look beyond stereotypes to the possibility of cooperation in such
an important legal and social arena.
First, it is possible that the Church's arguments are more easily
dismissed because of the perception that the Church opposes all
things "artificial," and the belief that in light of modern technol-
ogy, women's roles, and social choices, such a position should not
be taken seriously. In response, the Church may wish to stress that
it does not oppose all things "artificial" on a moral or a legal level.
Rather, it is a question for the Church of the distinction between a
technological intervention that seeks to realize a human good, ver-
sus one that destroys a human good. The Church's position on in-
terventions to prevent conception must also be distinguished from
those which cause the conception of a new life. Additionally, the
Church no longer advocates laws banning artificial contraception,
but, for the sake of the lives of third-parties, does advocate laws on
the subject of abortion, embryo research, and NRTs. Finally, many
might be persuaded, even if they do not see much social import in
private decisions to avoid conception, that decisions about the
processes for creating and destroying human life can significantly
affect social life.
Second, some may fear that there is a relationship between a
claimed anti-feminist strain in the Church's teachings and its posi-
tion on a woman's choice to use an NRT. One should note that it
is not only infertility, but also abortion, sexually transmitted dis-
ease (often themselves a result of non-marital sexual activity) and
the decision to put off having children, that can lead to the use of
NRTs. NRTs can circumvent the fertility problems that arise from
these practices. Therefore, some may interpret the Church's oppo-
sition to NRTs as intimately tied to its opposition to abortion and
non-marital sex, as well as the Holy Father's expressed preference
for married women to avoid the workplace if they can and to rear
their children full-time. 3 °
It is true the Church opposes many common practices that lead
to the use of NRTs. This also may be said about many persons in
130. FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO, supra note 32, at 21-22.
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society who are not Catholic. There are many popularly expressed
concerns about the individual and social toll on men and women
alike taken by abortion, sexually transmitted diseases and dramati-
cally delayed childbearing. Furthermore, the Church's opposition
to NRTs is not gender specific; it applies equally to men and to
women. It is also based explicitly upon concerns for children-per-
haps the most vulnerable parties in the matter-and for marital
stability; these concerns go beyond sexual practices.
Third, there is also the possibility the Church's teaching is per-
ceived to reflect too much its insistence on the complementarity of
the sexes-the idea that men and women are differently gifted, but
equal, and created to complement one another's gifts and natures.
This idea partly underlies the Church's insistence upon conception
within an ongoing marriage. Some reject the idea of complemen-
tarity, on the grounds that it can easily lead to women's subjuga-
tion to men, who are too easily perceived as being different in a
"better" way."' This concern might benefit from reflection on the
continuing choice by a majority of persons of heterosexual marital
arrangements, as well as the continued public attraction to the no-
tion of the inherent differences in the sexes.132 In other words,
complementarity is not solely a Catholic idea. Recent studies indi-
cating that children in heterosexual, two-parent households seem
to fare better than children in families with one parent, even when
such studies control for economic factors, should also be
considered. 133
Fourth, some may see the Church's position on NRTs through
the prism of its requirement that sexual intercourse take place only
within marriage. Many have definitively rejected this require-
ment. 134 Again, reflection on this point may be aided by consider-
ing that a significant percentage of Americans, though not a
majority, continue to believe that unmarried couples should not
engage in sexual intercourse.135 Furthermore, the difficulties faced
131. Rosemary Radford Reuther, Christian Understandings of Human Nature and
Gender, in RELIGION, FEMINISM, & THE FAMILY 96 (Anne Carr & Mary Stewart Van
Leeuwen eds., 1996).
132. See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS
(1992); DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND DISCOURSE (1996).
133. Sara McLanahan, The Consequences of Single Motherhood, in SEX, PREFER-
ENCE, AND FAMILY 306-18 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
134. Gallup Poll Analysis, Majority Considers Sex Before Marriage Morally Okay,
May 24, 2001 (stating that fifty-three percent of Americans report that sex between
"an unmarried man and women" is "morally acceptable"; forty-two percent say it is
morally wrong).
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by persons having children outside of marriage are commonly un-
derstood. Finally, repeating a scenario that has occurred many
times in the annals of family law, very little attention has been paid
to the well-being of the children conceived in the "new situations"
brought about by NRTs.
Fifth, and finally, some who reject the Church's teachings on
abortion may conclude that a large part of its teaching on NRTs is
constituted by its teaching on abortion, reiterated and writ small.
For a small percentage of persons who believe abortion ought to be
legal under all circumstances, this difference is not likely to be
bridged. However, most of the public is divided in a more nuanced
way from the Church on the question of abortion, with a slight ma-
jority holding that abortion ought to be illegal entirely, or legal
only in response to grave threats to the mother's well-being. 136
Negative public reaction to the Fall 2001 announcement that a bio-
technology company created human embryos solely for research
gives a further indication of the level of respect for human life. 137
In sum, the degree of respect owed the human embryo is an ongo-
ing question for much of the public, not solely a matter of the doc-
trine of the Catholic Church.
For some observers, the Catholic Church's stance on NRTs is out
of step with the times-the legal, the moral, and the social times.
For others, the Church's pronouncements are aspirational, idealis-
tic, but simply impossible to follow "after the Fall." Still, there is
no mistaking the significant agreement in the United States, not
only with the Church's stance on respect for incipient human life,
but also with the Church's fears about the effects of NRTs on the
adult participants as well as on the children produced. Perhaps it is
our established constitutional and social predilection for under-
standing all matters concerning procreation to be "private." Per-
haps it is the centuries'-old resistance to state interference with
"family" matters. Perhaps it is the result of an ingrained deference
to the medical and technological professions. Or perhaps it is in
large part because of the sheer strength of persons' desires to have
a baby. Whatever the explanation, the current laws and practices
of concerning the NRTs are far indeed from the Catholic Church's
views. At present, it is difficult to imagine this will change. Still,
legal and scientific experts, including many who support NRTs, are
beginning to point the way to much needed reforms which echo
136. Carey Goldberg & Janet Elder, Public Still Backs Abortion, But Wants Limits,
Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at 6A.
137. Sugg, supra, note 122, at 2A.
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somewhat concerns raised by the Church ab initio. At the same
time, considering the implications for the very meaning of human
life and the human family, if there are to be reforms, they are cer-
tainly taking their time in coming. One thing, however, is certain:
the Church will continue publicly to reflect on matters which, it
judges, go to the very nature of the human person, human families,
and human freedom.
